Deconstructing Self-Esteem
Matthew L. Whoolery and Judson Stelter
Brigham Young University
Presented at the Annual Convention of the American Psychological
Association in San Francisco, CA in August 2001.
Correspondence
about this article may be sent to Matthew Whoolery at mwhoolery@aucegypt.edu
Since 1977, there have been nearly 17,000 journal articles and dissertations with the term “self-esteem” in the title or abstract. And this number does not include the even greater amount of the use of self-esteem in popular psychology! Even an initial search on the internet yielded a half-million websites containing “self-esteem.” Of the articles published academically in the last year, none I found were evaluating or questioning the construct, but instead assuming that it is a real construct. Any theoretical construct with this kind of wide use ought to be based on sound theoretical grounding. We will argue that self-esteem is based on a weak and distinct philosophical foundation and provide an alternative view.
As with many psychological constructs, the number of definitions for self-esteem is nearly equivalent to the authors writing about it. We will include here just a few examples of the many definitions used by researchers. “By self-esteem we mean simply a favorable global evaluation of oneself” (Baumeister, Boden, & Smart, 1996, p. 5). “Self-esteem is the disposition to experience oneself as being competent to cope with the basic challenges of life and being worth of happiness” (Branden, 2001). Self-esteem is a “self-referential emotion…(and) also involves neurological, muscular, visceral—in short, bodily, responses and sensations” (Hewitt, 1998). This varied set of definitions illustrates the lack of a clear definition of self-esteem amongst both supporters and critics of self-esteem. Though the self-esteem movement has enjoyed decades of wide acceptance, there have been abundant critics as well.
The criticisms of self-esteem have come from many avenues, including educators, journalists, and scientists (Shmoker, 1989; Hewitt, 1998). The problem with most of the criticisms of self-esteem is that they still assume that self-esteem exists but disagree with another’s definition or how it is being implemented programatically. For example, in a book criticizing the self-esteem movement, “The Myth of Self-Esteem,” John Hewitt spends a great deal of time discussing the cultural basis for the view of self-esteem that he believes is most commonly perpetuated. Ultimately, however, he gives credence to self-esteem by another definition, calling self-esteem “universal” and names it as one of the self-referential emotions common to all people, similar to pride and shame (Hewitt, 1998, p. 124). So though his argument is critical of self-esteem as he sees it, he still supports the idea of self-esteem with simply another definition added to the existing mix.
Shmoker, an educator by training and well-known self-esteem critic, argues that self-esteem is earned rather than learned. He argues that “Like it or not, self-esteem is very much a function of such unyielding realities as what we can do, what we’ve done with what we have and what we’ve made of ourselves” (Shmoker, 1989). Again we see a criticism of self-esteem on how it is implemented, rather than whether or not it is a real and valid construct.
The disagreement between the critics and proponents of self-esteem on the issue of egotism illustrates the futility of arguing about the definition of self-esteem. Many accusations against self-esteem say that it is akin to egotism (e.g. Baumeister, et al., 1996). Nathaniel Branden, one of the most well-known proponents of self-esteem claims that “egotism is an attitude of bragging, boasting, arrogating to oneself qualities that one does not possess…-all evidences of insecurity and underdeveloped self-esteem” (Branden, 2001, p.2). He denies that healthy self-esteem is based on egotism or bragging, but on principles like self-acceptance, self-responsibility, self-assertiveness, personal integrity, and living consciously (Branden, 1994). The disagreement is not on the existence or validity of self-esteem, but on what exactly we mean by the term.
As can be seen above, the critics and proponents of the self-esteem movement agree with each other on some very important points, most importantly that self-esteem exists. One common idea contained in each of these quotes is the existence of a self. Though this may seem strange to question, it is still an assumption. Both critics and proponents also include in self-esteem some sort of positive inner feeling. For those arguing both sides of the issue, there is also agreement that we should be self-responsible and, though covertly, on the idea that self-service is the inevitable desire of individuals. Though these definitions and criticisms of self-esteem are only a few of many, they do illustrate the commonly held views of self-esteem.
The arguments against self-esteem have failed to make the point because they all support the idea of self-esteem while disagreeing with its use or definition. None argue that self-esteem is wrong at its philosophical root. We will argue that self-esteem is based on three basic concepts: self-existence, self-service, and self-responsibility. We will then illustrate alternatives to these ideas that provide a true disagreement with the premise of self-esteem.
One of the key ideas behind self-esteem theory is the existence of a self that is independent and separate from other selves. This idea is key to the understanding of and encouragement of self-esteem. Each individual is a self-contained “atom” with unique and individual traits. Each of these atoms is in some sense a closed universe, where its qualities and properties are contained within that universe. Though outside forces may act upon the self, it remains autonomous and separate. For example, a person that is depressed is assumed to have a “disease” that exists inside his or her own mind or body. Even if parents had been abusive as a child, that abuse is seen as being “carried around” with the depressed person. Characteristics like self-esteem, self-confidence, and happiness are in the same way contained within the skin of each individual. The source of self-esteem problems can also be found within each individual (even if the original source came from outside).
Self-esteem rests on the idea that we have an inherent “self-worth” that we carry around “inside our skin.” The self is seen as defined by itself, not by the judgments of or relationships with others (Branden 1997, 2001). Without this separate, individual existence, there would be no inherent properties of the self. Self-worth relies on the idea that we have worth that is stored somewhere inside our selves.
What are the implications of this idea of an atomistic or self-existing self? One of the most important is that of uniqueness. We must assume, if individuals are self-defined and have self-worth, that each person is unique and has different needs that are best known only to themselves. This individualism leads us to moral relativism, a universe consisting of individual “moral centers” which should be recognized and respected in their own right. Morality becomes a personal judgment, based upon how each individual sees the world and on their unique history. If we are self-worthy, why should one person have the right to impose rules upon another, especially if these rules make them feel less self-worthy? The answer seems to end up that we should not “impose” our rules or guidelines upon one another, but instead “live and let live.” This ideal brings us to the next theoretical construct upon which self-esteem theory is built, self-service.
Self-esteem proponents implicitly
or explicitly support self-service as the ultimate honorable act.
This self-service ideal is sometimes called “rational selfishness”
(Branden, 1985; Rand, A., 1957; Shaver, 1999).
People are taught to love themselves, respect themselves, and serve
themselves. Striving to meet
one’s own needs and desires is considered to be the proper and ultimate
motive. Religious ideals of
self-sacrifice, altruism and service to others are blamed for causing low
self-esteem and a host of social problems including totalitarian regimes (Branden,
1985). Focus on others rather than
self is seen to be the source of psychological problems.
Clients who are heavily involved in service to others may be encouraged
to “focus on your own needs more” or told “you are losing your identity
and independence.” Not only do
we seek our own needs, but we should
seek our own needs first.
This idea of self-service is apparent in many modes of psychotherapy. The major schools of psychotherapy are self-focused and involve activities and assignments intended for self-improvement and self-development. Indeed, individual psychotherapy itself is generally conceived of in individualistic terms. For example, cognitive psychology often presents homework assignments for a client to monitor their own thoughts, feelings, and behavior in order to enact some form of self-awareness and self-improvement. In fact, therapy itself seems based inherently on a view of self-service. Indeed, rationality itself, often seen as a goal in psychotherapy, is viewed as being self-serving or hedonistic (Chong, 1996; Shaver, 1999). It would be rare to find a therapist focusing on a client’s community service and service to family members. There are some types of psychotherapy that resist the self-focus and grant the strength of relationship. For example, some forms of group and family therapy are intended to be a focus on others and our relationships in context, rather than seen as a group of interacting atoms (e.g., Yalom, 1995).
The reasoning behind this focus on the self may be based upon the widespread notion that all of our decisions will be, always, made out of self-interest. Some say that this self-serving characteristic of humans gets to the base of “the most fundamental levels of social reality” (Rule, 1997, p. 79). The idea that we always act out of self-serving motivations is clearly one of the dominating ideas in modern psychology (Fisher Smith, 2000; Slife, 2000). There would be no reason to teach anything but self-service if this is all we believe people to be capable of doing. And if people cannot act out of truly self-sacrificing motives, our sense of responsibility is and can be focused only on the self.
The final concept underlying self-esteem theory is that of self-responsibility. Many of the critics of self-esteem are saying that people need to be responsible (rather than selfish), but by responsibility they mean an individualistic responsibility (Branden, 2001). Responsibility is seen as a personal obligation, to be true to our own morals and beliefs rather than true to some outside belief system.
In his essay “What Self-Esteem Is and Is Not,” Branden encourages this kind of “self-responsibility.” He describes this as “realizing that we are the author of our choices and actions; that each one of us is responsible for life and well-being and for the attainment of our goals” (p. 2). Unlike many religious ideals of responsibility to God or community, we are encouraged to be responsible for our own actions and the attainment of our own goals. There is no mention of other people in these “pillars of self-esteem.” Even integrity is seen as living according to our own knowledge and acting according to our own values. There is no mention of obligation or responsibility to others in our families or communities.
One example of the implementation of self-esteem programs has been seen repeatedly by one of the authors of this paper. He works with adolescents with criminal records, often involving sexual misconduct against others. Though it seems initially that these perpetrators of sexual crimes are too self-focused and not enough focused on the needs of others, they are constantly put through self-esteem building exercises and groups. So even when people are committing crimes against others, we seem to hold on to the idea that it is due to an inner deficiency that must be built up. We teach them to love and accept themselves, even in their state as sexual abusers because they have self-defined worth that does not relate to how they are with others. We teach them to “focus on themselves more” and foster independence and self-reliance. The only wrong they are seen to have committed is the act of putting their individual needs or desires before the individual needs and desires of another. This is not immoral per se, but a lack of respect for the other person’s individual rights.
This example, repeated in many different aspects in our educational system and our psychological work, illustrates the effect of our belief that the self is separate from all others. Morality becomes a personal decision and our primary obligation is to please our selves, as long as we don’t violate the individual rights of another. Our responsibility is to meeting our own goals, ideals, and moral standards. Even crimes against others are seen as due to an inner deficiency.
With this brief articulation of three principles or ideas upon which self-esteem builds, self-existence, self-service, and self-responsibility, we are ready to present some alternatives to these conceptual bases. We use the works of philosopher Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) to present a view that is alternative in all ways to the self-esteem view. He argues for existence for others, service to others, and responsibility for others.
In the writings of Emmanuel Levinas, he presents a view that we are in existence for others rather than for ourselves. Existence, according to Levinas, is primarily one of relationship with other people. And “this relationship is immediately and primordially one of obligation. Life is a being-for-the-other” (Williams & Gantt, in press). This is far different from the idea underlying self-esteem that we are in existence for our selves first. We are in existence for the Other (we follow Levinas in capitalizing Other to indicate a special, moral relationship) before our selves.
What does this idea mean for self-esteem theory? First, if taken seriously, it questions the very essence of self-esteem. If we are constantly in relationship with others, even before our own existence, then we are truly not independent of one another. Each of us has a self only in relationship with other selves, and this initial relationship is one of obligation. If anything, this would lead us to an opposing concept of Other-esteem which exists without our choice or acknowledgement of it, before concerns for the self. If the relationship with the Other comes before considerations of the self, we are in obligation to serve and be responsible for others.
We exist only in relationship with others. Levinas describes this relationship, saying that “since the Other looks at me, I am responsible for him, without even having taken on responsibilities in his regard; his responsibility is incumbent on me. It is responsibility that goes beyond what I do. Usually, one is responsible for what one does oneself. I say…that responsibility is initially a for the Other” (Levinas, 1985, p. 96). This stands in opposition to the value underlying self-esteem which says that we are self-responsible, or only responsible for our own actions.
One may ask that if I am responsible for the other, does that not make them responsible for me as well? This is not a equal relationship, it is one-sided, but in the opposite sense of self-esteem theory. Self-esteem theory says we are all responsible for our own acts. But this responsibility for the Other sets up a “non-symmetrical relation” in which “I am responsible for the Other without waiting for his reciprocity, were I to die for it. Reciprocity is his affair” (p. 98). So our responsibility for the Other is not based upon the actions of the other person—it is not a symmetrical give-take relationship. It is non-symmetrical, meaning that the Other is not responsible for me as I am for him or her. The responsibility we have is an “extreme formula” which “may not be detached from [its] context” (p. 99). The relationship is the thing; this is not primarily a set of ethical rules but an obligation that comes before cognition and rule-setting. It is real for us as we face another person in every context.
Levinas’s contributions to the understanding of our relationship with others are quite revolutionary in the context of our self-focused psychology. First, there is no moral relativism. Levinas argued tirelessly that we have a moral obligation to all others (Levinas, 1969). He often quoted Dostoyevsky in saying that “We are all responsible for all men before, and I more than all the others” (cited in Levinas, 1985). If we are truly responsible for others, before our responsibility for ourselves, we may have to develop a new idea we could call Other-esteem. Far from being a self-defined morality, or relativism, Other-esteem would call us to morality as the primal or first obligation before all other considerations or self-needs.
This would drastically change the work we may do with perpetrators of crimes against others. Therapy would be focused on the violation they have made against their obligation to the Other, specifically the person who was the victim of their crime and generally to all Others. Instead of looking for self-worth, treatment would encourage them to understand and cultivate this responsibility to the Other before the self. The denial of the moral and ethical relationship with others would be seen as the root of the problems, rather than self-esteem or a lack of self-fulfillment. Other-esteem would refute the idea of “live and let live” and replace it with “We are all responsible for all men before, and I more than all the others” (cited in Levinas, 1985).
For an illustration, we will describe how it may change the work with a male youth sex-offender. First of all, we would want the youth to acknowledge the Other, in a real sense. We would want him to try to understand the world through the eyes of the person who was a victim of his crime. He would be taught that he is not separate from the other person and that he is truly responsible for him or her. If he could see the Other as a real, living, breathing person rather than an object, he would be closer to seeing and acknowledging the responsibility he has for the other. Often we find antisocial youth saying things like “She was asking for it by dressing that way.” They are disengaged from the relationship with this Other person, unwilling or unable to acknowledge their obligation to serve and be responsible for the safety and well-being of the victim of their crime. It is not just a responsibility to leave them alone and do no harm, but a responsibility to care for, nurture, and protect the Other.
In therapy, there would also be a fostering of the ability to seek out the needs of others in self-less service. In working with juvenile offenders, the first author of this paper found that community service was a remarkable experience for these youth. We would often have them taking care of elderly people who needed constant care and nurturing. Some of the most hardened youth were softened as they responded to the needs of these elderly people and often spoke of them and wondered how they were doing. This seems a much more effective way to help someone change than helping them to foster their self-focus through therapeutic assignments that helped them focus more on their own needs. Most of us, offenders by the law or not, could use more connection to others and a recognition of our most basic reality of existence—obligation to the Other. If troubled youth were helped to forget their own needs and act according to their responsibility for the other, we could suspect that they would reconsider their acts of harm to others.
Finally, an Other-esteem program would teach responsibility for others before responsibility for self. Rather than helping our clients accept themselves or assert themselves, we would teach them to forget themselves and remember Others, in their families, communities, and elsewhere. If Levinas is right, this is not a responsibility that we take upon ourselves, we are under obligation simply because the Other exists! Our range of choice is whether or not to fulfill our responsibility, not whether or not we are responsible.
Conclusion
The concept of self-esteem is widely accepted without a clear look at its underlying assumptions. Self-esteem perpetuates the problem for which it was intended to fix. The pursuit of self-esteem, however defined, creates in individuals more self-focus and self-concern which only serve to exacerbate the problems of a self-focused society. There is, however, an alternative view which puts existence-for-the-other before existence-for-the-self and responsibility to the Other before responsibility to the self. We assert that this alternative can provide a way to decrease self-focus and the narcissism evident in modern American society.
References
American Psychological Association. (1992). Ethical principles of psychologists and code of conduct. American Psychologist, 47, 1597-1611.
Branden, N. (1985). Honoring the Self: Self-Esteem and Personal Transformation. New York: Bantam Books.
Branden, N. (1994). Six Pillars of Self-Esteem. New York: Bantam Books.
Branden, N. (1997). The art of living consciously. Needham Heights, MA: Simon & Schuster.
Branden, N. (2001). Answering Misconceptions About Self-Esteem. National Association for Self-Esteem [On-line]. Available: http://www.self-esteem-nase.org/journal01.shtml.
Chong, K.C. (1996). Moral agoraphobia: The challenge of egoism. New York: Peter Lang Publishing.
Levinas, E. (1969). Totality and Infinity (A. Lingis, Trans.). Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.
Levinas, E. (1985). Ethics and Infinity. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.
Manning, R.J.S. (1993). Interpreting otherwise than Heidegger. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.
Rand, A. (1957). Atlas Shrugged. New York: Random House.
Richardson, F.C., Fowers, B.J., & Guignon, C.B. (1999). Re-Envisioning Psychology: Moral Dimensions of Theory and Practice. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, Inc., Publishers.
Rule, J.B. (1997). Theory and progress in social science. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Shaver, R. (1999). Rational egoism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Slife, B.D. (2000). Hedonism: A hidden unity and problematic of society. The General Psychologist, 35, 77-78.
Williams, R.N & Gantt, E.E. (in press). Contributions of the work of Emmanuel Levinas. In E.E. Gantt & R.N. Williams (Eds.) Psychology For the Other: Pursuing a Science of the Ethical. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.
Yalom, I.D. (1995). The theory and practice of group psychotherapy. New York: Basic Books.